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It would be absurd to pretend that all the arguments of Banal Nationalism have been 
confirmed by the events that have occurred globally since the book was first published over 
twenty years ago. As I will suggest in this chapter, some of the book’s weaknesses and its 
over-simplifications have, in fact, become clearer over time. Nonetheless, one central theme 
has been reinforced and this is shown in all the chapters of the present volume. The authors 
take for granted that the issue of nationalism remains important. It was different when Banal 
Nationalism first appeared. The fashion then was for social scientists to claim that the world 
was moving inexorably towards a global, post-national age. Foremost among the theorists of 
globalization was the sociologist Ulrich Beck. He criticised Banal Nationalism because it 
concentrated on nationalism and ignored ‘banal cosmopolitanism’, thereby being, in his 
words, ‘selective to the point of distortion’. At the start of the twenty-first century any signs 
of banal nationalism were, according to Beck, ‘only islands in an overwhelming river of 
banal cosmopolitanism’ (Beck and Willms, 2003, p. 37).  
Nationalism and the world of nation-states has not withered away. In the past twenty 
years there have been massive shifts in populations across national borders, but this has not 
meant that those borders have been trampled down. Quite the contrary, within the countries to 
which the migrants have been fleeing, there has been pressure to strengthen borders. 
Generally boundaries continue to be policed, as well as to be contested both politically and 
militarily. The boundaries within the European Union might have been relaxed but those 
around the Union have been strengthened to exclude migrants. According to a recent book, 
the number of border walls in the world has increased. In 1989, there were fifteen border 
walls but by 2016 there were seventy. The number of deaths at borders has been rising, 
reaching record figures in 2015 (Jones, 2016). The new president of the United States 
campaigned for a wall to be built along his nation’s border with Mexico. All this building of 
border walls and the heightened concern for boundaries is happening at a time when global 
trade and international travel are increasing. 
Beck and others were mistaken when they assumed that global forces were 
antithetical to the particularity of nations and that as the former increased so inevitably the 
latter would decline. None of the contributors to this book have found it difficult to identify 
the existence of nationalism in the modern world. Their examples are to hand; they have not 
had to search for increasingly rare islets that have not yet been submerged by the rising 
waters of cosmopolitanism. Nor have they needed to start their chapters by justifying that 
they are taking the topic of nationalism seriously. As was suggested in Banal Nationalism, 
the world of nation-states has historically been an international world, for internationalism 
rests upon nationalism and vice versa. In this spirit, Craig Calhoun writes that ‘forgetting the 
international character of nationalism is conducive to illusory notions of how globalization 
will affect nationalism’. He is rightly baffled by ‘how many people have imagined that 
globalization will simply replace nationalism with a universal, cosmopolitan consciousness’. 
A number of the chapters highlight the links between nationalism and 
internationalism. Atsuko Ichijo provides an excellent empirical example when he examines 
how UNESCO included cooking as a protected cultural heritage. Ijiko notes the contradiction 
between UNESCO’s position as an organization promoting universal values and its desire to 
promote the value of particular cultures. UNESCO operates within a national context: it 
encouraged official bids from the nation-states of Japan and France that parts of their 
respective culinary cultures be granted the status of protected cultural heritage. The 
contradictory position of UNESCO is hardly surprising. Its parent organization, the United 
Nations, is an international organization devoted to universal aims, while being comprised of 
individual nation-states. In consequence, the UN’s internationalism is inextricably connected 
with the nationalism of established, recognized nation-states. 
One of the main themes of Banal Nationalism was that signs of nationalism can be 
too familiar to be noticed. Whereas ordinary citizens may fail to observe the national symbols 
on the stamps that they are affixing to their letters or on the banknotes that they are spending 
in shops, it is less forgivable that social theorists should routinely be so unobservant. Social 
scientists have concealed the nationalism of Western nations by labelling it positively as 
‘patriotism’, which they contrast favourably, but unjustifiably, with the ‘nationalism’ of 
others. As Calhoun comments, Banal Nationalism argued that ordinary people and social 
theorists have shared common blind-spots and that the book drew attention to signs of 
nationalism that often pass unrecognized. However, if such signs are ‘often’ unnoticed that 
does not mean that they are always so. Shanti Sumartojo makes the very reasonable point that 
from time to time individuals can notice the signs that they generally overlook – becoming, 
for instance, suddenly aware of the nationalist meaning of a road name on a well-travelled, 
familiar route. She notes that Banal Nationalism did not attempt to say how such episodes of 
sudden, individual recognition might occur. The book, of course, had its own blind-spots. 
Before proceeding to discuss some of Banal Nationalism’s other simplifications, it 
might be helpful to discuss what I believe to be a misunderstanding. This comes in the 
chapter by Ivana Spasić. She writes about the Serbia and she claims that the concept of ‘banal 
nationalism’ is, at the very minimum, inappropriate for understanding the Serbian situation. 
This is because the notion of ‘banal nationalism’, at least as outlined in my book, contains 
ethnocentric presuppositions, which express a Western bias against the non-Western world 
and against countries such as Serbia. This is an important charge that deserves to be 
examined. 
Spasić claims that in Banal Nationalism I was arguing that there were two distinct 
types of nationalism – banal nationalism and hot nationalism. According to Spasić, I equated 
banal nationalism with the nations of the West and hot nationalism with the non-Western 
world or with nations like Serbia that are situated on the ‘semi-periphery’. She suggests that 
Banal Nationalism unequivocally condemned Serbian nationalism as non-banal nationalism 
and thereby sharply distinguished it from the banal nationalism of established nations. The 
result was that book expressed pro-Western assumptions that are tantamount to ‘orientalism’. 
Spasić suggests that my preface to the Serbian edition of Banal Nationalism represents a 
change of thinking, for there I contemplated the possibility of Serbian banal nationalism. 
I do not wish to dispute Spasić’s observations about Serbian politics about which she 
knows far more than I do. However I would wish to dispute her interpretation of Banal 
Nationalism. I was arguing that the established nations of the West are deeply nationalist 
although their citizenry and sociological theorists often overlook this nationalism. 
Unfortunately, Spasić, in offering quotations to suggest that I was biased in favour of 
Western nations, sometimes quotes from the views that I was criticising in Banal Nationalism 
rather than those that I was upholding. Certainly I was not suggesting that the nations of the 
West were only nationalist in a banal sort of way. When I was writing Banal Nationalism, the 
British government was engaged militarily in Northern Ireland with Irish nationalists, who 
wanted the province to secede from the United Kingdom. In the book I criticised the 
ideological and theoretical bias which led only to the secessionists being labelled as 
‘nationalist’. The British government typically was not called ‘nationalist’, although it used 
force ‘in the interest of maintaining, rather than challenging, present national boundaries’ 
(Billig, 1995, p. 48). I was seeking to expose the ideological blindness which routinely calls 
politics aimed at altering nationalist boundaries ‘nationalist’, but which equally routinely 
withholds the same label from politics aimed at maintaining those same boundaries. 
Banal Nationalism aimed to apply the word ‘nationalism’ to the processes, often 
unnoticed, by which established nation-states are re-produced day-by-day. Spasić is correct to 
suggest that the processes of re-producing a nation-state differ from those involved in 
producing or creating the nation-state in the first place. The book assumes that the original 
formation of most nation-states, which have become established over time, was violent and 
backed by imaginative and highly conscious declarations about the nature of the state, its 
people and its claimed territory. This is certainly true of the United States of America, 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and so on. When Banal Nationalism was originally 
written, Serbia was in the process of being produced, rather than being re-produced. If there 
is a difference between the first edition Banal Nationalism and the preface for the Serbian 
edition, it is that Serbian history has moved on. From being a nation, which was in the violent 
process of being produced, Serbia by 2009 was becoming a nation-state which will be banally 
re-produced. 
I believe that Spasić over-simplifies Banal Nationalism when she presents it as 
suggesting that the processes of banal nationalism are typically confined to the West and that 
the nationalism of the rest of the world is non-banal. It was a major theme of Banal 
Nationalism that the ideology of nationalism is international - indeed, global. In this respect, 
‘ideology’ denotes the sorts of beliefs which seem so obvious – so natural - to those who live 
in a particular age that they require, to use Melissa Aronczyk’s phrase, few narratives of 
justification. For the last hundred years, it has been taken for granted, or treated as common-
sense, that ‘nations’ exist and that a world divided into independent nation-states is ‘natural’. 
We imagine that the world was always like this, although historically nation-states belong to 
the modern era. Particular nations, especially those that have not established their separate 
independence, might produce their own particular narratives of justification to support their 
claims for statehood, but nationhood per se today does not require justification.  Moreover, as 
argued in Banal Nationalism, the belief in the ‘naturalness’ of nations and in the world of 
nations is itself global: it is not confined to specific continents.  
That being so, banal nationalism, as one of the means by which established nations 
are re-produced, will not be confined to the nation-states of the west. It is likely to be found 
in any established or establishing state wherever it might be situated. Subsequent researchers 
have been able to find instances of banal nationalism across different continents. Crawford 
Young (2004) writes of the dozens of banal ways in which the new nations of Africa 
subliminally communicate nationhood through their flags, currency, postage stamps, identity 
cards and so on (see also Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011, and Fuller, 2008, for further African 
examples). Banal nationalism has been observed in Iran (Elhan, 2016), Syria and Jordan 
(Phillips, 2011) and Argentina (Benwell and Dodds, 2011; Benwell, 2014). If Serbia is part of 
the ‘semi-periphery’, then Turkey, straddling Europe and Asia, might be thought to be semi-
semi-peripheral. Nevertheless, researchers have found in the Turkish press analogous forms 
of banal nationalism as can be seen in the British press (Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000; Kös and 
Yılmaz, 2012). 
Of course, it might be argued in defence of Spasić that such investigations have 
expanded the concept of ‘banal nationalism’ beyond what I had intended in Banal 
Nationalism. Significantly, the researchers, who have found African, Asian and South 
American forms of banal nationalism, do not present their findings as if they are 
contradicting what had been argued in that book. Phillips claims to show that ‘the everyday 
reproduction of nationalism which Billig identified in the West can be successfully adapted 
and transposed onto Syria and Jordan’ (2011, p. 3). According to Phillips, Banal Nationalism 
argued that ‘the reproduction of nations in the West takes two forms: the conscious, overt 
flag-waving, such as 4th July parades in the USA, and the banal, un-waved flags that hang 
unnoticed on public buildings and outside houses’ (p. 11). This I believe takes us to the centre 
of Spasić’s dissatisfaction with, and possible misunderstanding of my 1995 book. 
According to Spasić, I suggested in Banal Nationalism not only that banal nationalism 
is principally confined to the nations of the West, but also that this is the principal form of 
nationalism to be found in the West and that very different forms of nationalism exist outside 
of the West. She writes that in my book ‘the dichotomy banal/non-banal is basically framed 
as Us/Them’ and that ‘some people have one, others have the other; “We” have this one, 
“They” (and some stray members of “Us”) have the other’. However, as Phillips’ quotation 
suggests, Banal Nationalism did not assert that the Western nations have a single form of 
nationalism, but that nationalism in established states, whether of the West or elsewhere, 
takes two forms – the banal and the non-banal. Indeed, the book argued that banal 
nationalism is the backdrop for more overtly nationalist episodes in the West. 
That is why Banal Nationalism connected unwaved US flags with the highly 
nationalist passions of the first Gulf War; and British banal nationalism with the speedy 
mobilization of the British public in support of the Falklands/Malvinas war. As such, banal 
nationalism, far from being innocently peaceful, is the precondition for nationalist violence 
committed by established nations. Since 1995, the world has seen the US-led invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention interventions by the USA and Russia in Syria. All these 
campaigns have been accompanied by outpourings of nationalism within the established 
nations that are doing the intervening and the invading. The argument of Banal Nationalism 
was that the populations of such countries could not be mobilized so quickly and so 
successfully for sudden military campaigns without the steady existence of banal nationalism 
in between the episodes of hot nationalism. 
There are, nevertheless, a number of over-simplifications in Banal Nationalism which 
later researchers, including those in the present volume, have commented upon. As can often 
happen, social scientists, who aim to draw attention to phenomena that have previously been 
overlooked, can emphasise their case rhetorically by presenting clear exemplars. In 
consequence, they can end up with illustrations that resemble ‘ideal types’, rather than 
examining the complexities of actual cases as they messily unfold in real life. Banal 
Nationalism was a comparatively short book of less than two hundred pages. So, 
simplifications can be expected, although that does not excuse them. It is the task of 
subsequent investigators to fill in the complex details. I now think that the one chapter, which 
aimed to provide an empirical investigation to support the theoretical ideas of the book, 
considerably over-simplified matters. As critics have noted, the one-day study of newspapers 
failed to emphasise sufficiently the English dimension of the papers that were analysed. It did 
not distinguish adequately between the banal re-production of England as compared with that 
of Britain, let alone the United Kingdom. In addition, I ignored the newspapers of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, failing to discuss how such newspapers might portray, both 
banally and non-banally, the complex national contexts in which they were published. Such 
points have been made by subsequent critics, whose observations contribute to understanding 
the complex forms that banal nationalism can take in nations within nations (for example, 
Law, 2001; Rosie et al, 2004; MacInnes, 2007 et al; Skey, 2009).  
Today, I would concede that the day-study of newspapers contain obvious gaps and 
also that the analysis itself often failed to probe the rhetorical complexities of the 
phenomenon that it aimed to demonstrate. The book argues that there is a contrast between 
hot nationalism and banal nationalism – metaphorically illustrated as the contrast between the 
waved and the unwaved flag. But this contrast, which may have made the basic theme more 
understandable, is too stark. It implies that at one moment there are no waved flags and at the 
next all is a blur of waving flags. As Skey (2009) has noted, there are gradations between hot 
and cold nationalism and that the gradations of temperature are better represented by talking 
about heating and cooling nationalist temperatures. Generally the social sciences benefit by 
using verb phrases (‘heating and cooling nationalist temperatures’) rather than noun phrases 
(‘hot and cold nationalism’) to describe processes brought about by human actions (Billig, 
2013). Using the phrases of heating and cooling nationalist temperatures emphasises the 
gradations in between the extremes. Hopefully such phrases will encourage investigators to 
point to the ways that actors might be heating up or cooling down moments of nationalism. 
The inadequacy of just using the concepts of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ nationalism does not 
stop there. It is a mistake – and a mistake to be found in Banal Nationalism – to suppose that 
each moment in the history of nationalism can be summarised by a single temperature. The 
heating and cooling of nationalism can occur at the same time in the same place. If I had 
looked more carefully at my single day survey of the English press, I would have found this. I 
presented the survey as representing a moment of banal nationalism. The day’s papers also 
described the successes and failures of the nation’s sportsmen and women. The items were 
encouraging little cheers or feelings of minor disappointment. The nationalist temperature 
was warming on some pages of the press as it was cooling on others: indeed, it might be 
moving in both directions on the same page and even within the same paragraph. 
In this volume, Lukasz Szulc takes this idea further. He notes how lesbians and gays 
using LGBTQ websites in Poland and Turkey employ the language of banal nationalism in 
order to ‘domesticate’ such sites. In illustrating this, Szulc connects the complexity of 
nationalism’s temperature with the emphasis in Banal Nationalism on top-down signs of 
nationhood. By contrast, Szulc looks at the way that ordinary people can challenge and 
reinterpret official signs and then use their reinterpretations banally. It should be added that 
since the publication of Banal Nationalism there has been of growth of research examining 
episodes of such bottom-up nationalism. This volume contains a number of such studies 
besides Szulc’s. Those who study nationalism in this way sometimes wish to distinguish what 
they call ‘everyday nationalism’ from ‘banal nationalism’. In my view, analysts of 
nationalism do not need to choose between taking the one approach or the other, as if there is 
a theoretical zero-sum game at work. As Szulc’s chapter illustrates, it is possible to combine 
creatively the study of everyday actions that re-produce and re-imagine the nation, with an 
awareness of how that re-imagined nation can also be re-produced banally. Investigators, 
therefore, should try to avoid assuming that the reality of ‘banal nationalism’ must reflect the 
sorts of simplifications to be found in the book of the same name and that anything more 
complex should be taken as evidence for the non-existence of banal nationalism. As Szulc 
comments there is still work to be done on banal nationalism. In particular, as he comments, 
there remains amazingly little interest in researching the banal nationalism of the United 
States. 
There is a simplification of emotions in Banal Nationalism, relating to the contrast 
between banal and hot nationalism. Calhoun, in his chapter, rightly claims that there is a 
certain ‘flatness’ in my characterisation of banal nationalism. Partly this comes from 
concentrating on the unnoticed, banal aspects of nationalism – the weather maps, the 
nationally deictic use of the definite article (le président, the prime minister, el país, ha-aretz 
and so on), and all the other barely noticed but ever present signs of nationhood. These are 
not matters to stir the heart but that is precisely the point. However, nationalism, as Calhoun 
points out, cannot rest solely upon such pallid factors. It requires, to use Calhoun’s phrase, 
‘an imaginary’, so that each nation imagines itself to be unique. And in imagining itself to be 
unique, the particular nation is just like all other nations, imagining themselves to be unique. 
Nor is hot nationalism circumscribed by the waving of the flag – as if there is only 
absence of emotion or feelings of intense enthusiasm with no points in-between. There are 
other uses of the flag beyond being waved or not waved. I regret that I did not comment upon 
the common, international trope of the flag draped over the coffin. Here the emotions can be 
complex: sadness, respect, solemnity and so on. In the context in which the image of the 
coffin-draped flag is often displayed, the image can also be interpreted as expressing 
‘necessary’ sacrifice and the ‘just’ desire for revenge. The familiarity of the visual trope 
means that its emotional semantics do not need to be specified each time the image is 
presented. Distant observers within the nation, seeing the image by means of television, 
internet or newspapers, can respond with appropriate emotion - not that all will do so. 
Banal Nationalism did not discuss in detail how the banally reproduced signs might 
be received – who will fail to notice them, who will register approval and who will react with 
disapproval (even outrage). The work did not aim to detail individual differences, or even 
communal differences. If the book expressed a tendency to suppose that officially produced 
images, phrases and signs will always be accepted unthinkingly then this is regrettable. The 
present volume contains two studies which dramatically show how an official governmental 
policy on citizenship – the official imagining of the nation – can be rejected by many 
members of the nation. Manolis Pratsinakis and Gesine Wallem discuss how citizens can 
dissent in their everyday actions from the official definitions of nationhood. These citizens 
are not ‘nationalists’ in the traditional sense of the term because they do not wish to secede 
from their nation, or to re-draw its boundaries or to base politics around the idea of the 
nation. Instead, they wish to exclude from the nation some who officially qualify for their 
nation’s citizenship. 
Pratsinakis and Wallem present evidence from two populations, living in different 
countries but sharing similar reactions. Pratsinakis looks at the reactions of native Greeks to 
incomers from the former Soviet Union whom the Greek government has declared to be 
ethnically Greek. Wallem examines a similar situation in Germany. In both cases, the 
incomers are not accepted as fellow citizens by many of the natives who see them primarily 
as ‘Russians’. They criticise the incomers for speaking Russian among themselves, for 
behaving in so-called typically ‘Russian’ ways, and generally for being ‘really’ Russian, 
rather than ‘really’ Greek or German. To use a concept that Aronczyk uses in her chapter, 
these native inhabitants see their governments as committing ‘categorical treachery’ when 
they accepted these essentially ‘foreign’ incomers as if they were ‘properly’ Greek or 
German. This nationalist complaint represents what analysts have termed ‘everyday 
nationalism’, as compared with the sort of top-down official symbols of nationhood discussed 
in Banal Nationalism.  
Nevertheless, in crucial ways this sort of everyday nationalism rests upon an 
unexamined, banal assumption: namely that everyone, or virtually everyone, in the world of 
nations belongs ‘properly’ to a particular nation. The incomers, according to the 
complainants, have no place here in ‘our’ homeland because they are properly ‘Russian’. The 
complainants do not have to spell out their ideological reasoning from first principles. The 
deep logic that nations can and should exclude those who do not belong is part of a common-
sense that is accepted from nation to nation. These Greek and German complainants can 
make their arguments with accusatory stereotypes, using the unexpressed, exclusionary 
assumptions of nationalism – not just ‘our’ nationalism but nationalism internationally – to 
justify their specific complaints about ‘them’. It is these deep assumptions about belonging 
and, most importantly, about not-belonging to nations that, in a time of mass migration, can 
leave millions in makeshift, exposed camps, unwelcome in the countries to which they have 
fled and unable to return to their so-called ‘proper’ countries. The leaders and populations of 
other nations wring their hands: these unfortunates do not belong ‘here’ with ‘us’, they say. 
To demonstrate ‘our’ magnanimity and the goodness of ‘our’ great nation, ‘we’ will accept a 
few – a very few - but all the others in their millions must go elsewhere, preferably back to 
‘their’ own lands where ‘they’ supposedly belong but where they have suffered so much. 
Calhoun is surely correct in claiming that the imagining of nations can be performed 
imaginatively. He writes that ‘the idea of social imaginaries is precisely a bridge between the 
objectively recurrent and the subjectively enacted.’ He also suggests that Banal Nationalism 
was over-critical of nationalism. Far from being uniformly pernicious, nationalism can be 
integral to positive projects. Democracy, for example, depends upon notions of the nation, or 
the national people, making its choice. In this regard, it rests today upon national 
‘imaginaries’. But here is the problem: the assumptions of nationhood and the dominance of 
the national ‘imaginary’ have not just produce exclusive communities but they have, in 
effect, blocked out alternative ways of imagining the political past and present. 
Recently I have been examining the annual celebration in the Portuguese parliament 
commemorating the 1974 overthrow of dictatorship (Billig and Marinho, in press). This is not 
an example of banal nationalism, for metaphorically the flag is waved on these occasions, as 
‘we’ celebrate ‘our’ history and ‘our’ great triumph. Such a ceremony is what the classical 
rhetoricians called ‘epideictic’. Modern rhetorical analysts claim that national epideictic 
ceremonies affirm a sense of collective belonging (for example, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1968; Condit, 1985). In the Portuguese ceremony the national context dominates the 
ceremony and both banal and imaginative rhetoric are to be found intermingled. What 
Calhoun calls the national ‘imaginary’ overwhelms any other form of imagining politics – 
thereby constraining, as well as expanding what can be politically imagined. 
The Portuguese deputies, as they celebrate the historic overthrow of the Salazarist 
dictatorship, typically pursue current partisan politics. Sometimes in these celebrations 
speakers from the right will dispute with those from the left about the term ‘the people’ (o 
povo). Both, however, will accept the nationalist meaning of the term: in the context of the 
celebration ‘the people’ refers to the people of Portugal. In the 2010 ceremony, a speaker 
from the right was talking about his party’s view on re-writing the formal constitution of 
Portugal. The speaker explicitly criticised the left-wing concept of o povo, which refers to the 
unprivileged mass as contrasted with the privileged few. The speaker claimed that all 
Portuguese belonged to o povo, rich and poor, the shareholder as well as the worker. A 
deputy from the Communist Party then interrupted, calling out: ‘Strike out the shareholder!’ 
Left-wing deputies responded with laughter. 
We can ask why the left-wing deputies laughed. At its minimum such laughter 
indicates that the left was not seriously advocating that the constitution should be revised to 
exclude shareholders from citizenship. If this were the actual policy, then cheers and 
applause, not laughter, could be expected. The intervention and the accompanying laughter 
illustrates the extent to which a former dream of universal unity  (the dream of workers of the 
world uniting) has become nationalised in the twenty-first century.  Now the thought of 
removing shareholders from the nation, like a Freudian fantasy, can only be expressed as a 
joke, rather than as a serious desire. 
This illustrative example might seem unimportant but it expresses something that is 
today so familiar, so banal, as to be hardly worth noticing. The term ‘the people’ has been co-
opted nationally within the world of nations, and has been correspondingly emptied of its 
non-national, even anti-national, class-based meaning. An imagined politics, not based 
around the imagined nation, is virtually unimaginable. Thus, the so-called national 
‘imaginary’ also represents a restriction of political imagination. In this respect, nationalism 
is not a disappearing island about to be overcome by the tidal flow of internationalism. It 
remains the dominant political ideology of today, determining what politics is to be seriously 
practised and what can only be non-seriously imagined.  
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